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colonial Government of India purchased a majority ownership stake in private railways
at predetermined dates set by contracts negotiated decades before the companies came
under state ownership. Controlling for individual railway fixed effects, year fixed effects,
and railway-specific time trends, we find no evidence of a decline in TFP following
state takeovers of private companies. Instead of reducing productivity, as the recent
experiences with privatization would suggest, we find that the Government of India
maintained productivity when it became the owner of railways. Government ownership
influenced certain areas of operations such as the capital-labor ratio, but not others
such as fares. Our results point to the conditions where state ownership is no worse
than private ownership in terms of productivity.
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1 Introduction
Economists and policymakers alike have long been interested in the costs and benefits of
private versus state ownership. Although state ownership has been on the decline since the
1970s, large and important industries in many developing countries, especially Brazil, India,
Russia, and China continue to remain under state ownership. In these and other countries
where the state has a large ownership presence it is important to know whether there are
any productivity losses from state ownership. The empirical literature on privatization ar-
gues that private ownership usually results in increased productivity suggesting that state
ownership has efficiency costs (see surveys by Megginson and Netter 2001, Djankov and Mur-
rell 2002, Guriev and Megginson 2007, and Estrin, Hanousek, Kočenda and Svejnar 2009).
However, many studies focus on short panels comparing the three year pre-privatization per-
formance to the three year post-privatization performance of the same firm.1 Such analyses
miss the potential long run impact of an ownership change and are likely to confound the
effects of privatization with other macroeconomic changes. Moreover, privatized firms are
a selected sample and econometric analyses focusing only on these firms could significantly
overstate the positive impact of privatization.
This paper uses the lens of history to better understand the effects of state and private
ownership. Our historical setting—railways in colonial India—is especially suited to study
this question for four reasons. First, there was a complete transition in the main trunk
lines from private ownership to majority state ownership, which eliminates concerns about
selection. Second, the timing of state takeovers was exogenous to firm performance because
it was predetermined in contracts signed decades before the actual takeovers. As a result, the
colonial state could not time takeovers to coincide with periods of increasing or decreasing
productivity. Third, we have constructed a long panel of railways from 1874 to 1912 that
allows us to distinguish between short and long run effects of state ownership. Fourth, we
observe multiple railways being taken-over. By contrast most infrastructure settings study
a single private or state firm undergoing an ownership transition.
The initial rail network in India was built and owned by British companies through the
1870s. The companies received a subsidy in the form of a 5% dividend guarantee to investors.
A clause in the original contracts allowed the colonial Government of India to purchase
railway companies only at specified future dates. Beginning in the 1870s, the Government
1Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh (1994) were the first to exploit such a before-after comparison of
the same firm. This was a positive departure from earlier papers that relied on cross-sectional comparisons
of private and state owned enterprises. See the summary tables in Guriev and Megginson (2007) for a list
of papers that have used the MNR framework.
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began to exercise its purchase option and over the next three decades the Government of
India took ownership of all the former private railways. By 1910 the Government owned
over 70 percent of railway miles compared to less than 10 percent in 1875. The general
movement to nationalize railways in India was driven by political and fiscal considerations.
In this paper, we examine how state takeovers in India influenced a wide range of perfor-
mance measures namely, total factor productivity or TFP, partial productivity in capital,
fuel and labor, and other aspects of firm behavior such as investment, the capital-labor
ratio, and average freight and passenger fares. Following the standard approach in the pro-
ductivity literature, we measure TFP as a residual from a production function (Syverson
2011, Van Biesebroeck 2008) using passenger miles and ton miles as output. The inputs
are labor, fuel, and capital. Our baseline specification controls for individual railway fixed
effects, year fixed effects, and railway-specific time trends. Thus, we are identifying the
effects of ownership by exploiting variation within railways over time.
Our empirical strategy addresses the possibility that railway companies could anticipate
takeovers and respond accordingly. The main worry is that firms anticipating takeovers
could run down investment and productivity in the years before takeover. Thus, TFP could
be trending down in the years before takeover, which would generate a biased coefficient
on state ownership. It seems the Government of India was also concerned about such
anticipation effects because the original contracts specified that companies would receive
the market value of their stock price averaged over the three years before takeover. To test
for anticipation effects by private companies, we interact state ownership with an indicator
variable for the 3-year window before takeover. We also test for differential short and long
run effects by interacting state ownership with an indicator variable for the first three years
after takeover including the year of takeover, and for 3 or more years after takeover.
The empirical results yield a clear conclusion: state ownership had a negligible impact
on the TFP of Indian railways. Our period of study was one of high productivity growth
in railways. Even after state takeovers, railways did not deviate from this general trend
of high productivity growth. In specifications that control for anticipation effects, we find
no significant decline in TFP in the years before takeover and the main effect on state
ownership is unchanged. There are also no significant differences in the impact of state
ownership between the short run (first 3 years after takeover) and the long run (3 or more
years after). Moreover, the results on partial productivity and fares find no evidence of a
negative impact of state ownership.
Interestingly, we find capital intensity (i.e., capital to labor ratio) increased following
state takeovers. This possibily relates to the Government reducing or eliminating dividend
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guarantees under state ownership. While the guarantees arguably encouraged capital in-
vestment in the early phase of Indian railway development, by the late nineteenth century
they clearly raised the cost of capital because of declines in the interest rate and hence
the Government’s cost of borrowing. Unlike contemporary settings, the colonial Govern-
ment also did not expand employment after takeover, another factor contributing to higher
capital-labor ratios.
Overall, the findings relate to a growing literature on the organization and efficiency of
Indian railways. Historians have written extensively about regulation and ownership mostly
focusing on whether dividend guarantees to private railways was a useful policy.2 We have
contributed to this literature in our previous work. In Bogart and Chaudhary (2012) we
find that variable costs declined following the switch to state ownership without an increase
in the number of accidents. In Bogart and Chaudhary (2013) we estimate the aggregate
performance of Indian railways and find high TFP growth rates relative to other sectors of
the Indian economy and railways in other parts of the world.
In this paper, we return to the question of state ownership using newly constructed
railway-level series on capital and fuel inputs along with freight and passenger fares. By
expanding our scope to capital and related measures of total and partial productivity, this
paper offers a comprehensive study of the effects of state ownership on the performance of
Indian railways. Unlike the findings on variable costs (Bogart and Chaudhary 2012), we find
no positive effects of Government ownership on total factor productivity or fares. We find
positive effects of state ownership on capital intensity, but interestingly the more capital
intensive railway systems did not translate into productivity gains. The overall picture
suggests the Government takeover of Indian railways had a neutral effect on performance.
Our findings are different from many empirical studies in the privatization literature. A
recent survey by Guriev and Megginson (2007) suggests average productivity improves by
20 percent following privatization.3 However, in our case a 95 percent confidence interval
for the long run effect of state ownership on TFP ranges from negative 7 percent to positive
8 percent. It is far from a 20 percent decline in productivity that would be predicted by
many privatization studies.
Although different from much of the literature, we are not the first to find negligible or
mixed effects from state ownership. For example, Kole and Mulherin (1997) find no difference
in performance of US firms that came to be government-owned during World War II. Feng,
Sun and Tong (2004) find no difference in income and efficiency between government-linked
2See Sanyal 1930, Thorner 1977, Kerr 2007, Sweeney 2011, Hurd and Kerr 2012 among others.
3For similar estimates of privatization see Jones and Mygind (2002), La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes
(1999), Claessens and Djankov (2002).
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companies and a matched sample of non-government-linked companies in Singapore. Studies
of firms in China (Sun and Tong, 2003) and Spain (Villalonga, 2000) also fail to find large
positive effects of privatization. Using a large panel of Eastern European firms, Brown,
Earle and Telegdy (2006) find an increase in TFP after private takeovers in Romania and
Hungary, but no effect of private takeovers on TFP in Ukraine, and a negative effect in
Russia.
In the railway sector the link between ownership and productivity is also mixed. A classic
study by Caves and Christensen (1980) finds no difference in the productivity performance
between the state owned Canadian National and privately owned Canadian Pacific. How-
ever, Laurin and Bozec (2001) find that the Canadian National’s productivity rose faster
just prior to and after its privatization in 1995. Estache, González, Trujillo (2002) find sim-
ilar positive effects for productivity following the recent privatization of railways in Brazil
and Argentina. Using historical cross-county data, Bogart (2010) finds that railway nation-
alizations are associated with lower cost efficiency but the manner of nationalization is also
important. Efficiency is lower when the state takes over private railways compared to when
the state constructs national railways.
This naturally leads to the question: when is state ownership harmful for productivity
and when is it no worse than private ownership? The Indian case suggests three relevant
factors. First, a private sector operating under rate of return guarantees is more likely
to produce comparable productivity to firms in the public sector. In the case of Indian
railways, guarantees weakened incentives to improve peformance and over time they lead
to biases in the cost of capital. Second, productivity under state ownership is likely to be
more similar to private ownership if the government is undemocratic. The famous economist
Alfred Marshall quoted a saying in the early 1900s, which argued that “under a democratic
constitution, state railways corrupt politics and politics corrupt state railways (p. 496).”
The Indian case supports this assertion. In India the undemocratic colonial state was not
beholden to public sector labor unions or local politicians. The British administrators that
ran India had little incentive to use railways as a tool to buy votes—say by providing jobs
or building a station in every town.Third, productivity under state ownership is likely to
be similar to private ownership whenever the performance of the enterprise is of great value
to the government. In colonial India, government owned railways were a key contributor to
gross government revenues—35 percent by 1913. The colonial government had a weak fiscal
system and thus could not easily generate the same revenues from other sectors. Railways
also provided key logistical support in defending the empire. Britain’s control over India
would have been more tenuous had it not been able to quickly move troops to various
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frontiers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant institutional
details followed by how the theoretical literature on ownership applies to the Indian context
in section 3. We describe our data in section 4 and empirical strategy in section 5. The
results are presented in section 6 followed by conclusions in section 7.
2 Background on Indian Railways
The main Indian trunk lines were constructed in the 1850s and 1860s by British railway
companies. Ten such companies incorporated in Britain entered into contracts with the
Secretary of State, a British Cabinet member with formal control over the administration
of India. Two of the original companies merged leaving 8 such companies by 1870. Figure 1
depicts the railway companies operating in India in 1870 and their routes. The oldest and
largest of these companies were the East Indian and the Great Indian Peninsula Railways
connecting the ports of Calcutta and Bombay respectively to the interior of the country.
Sind, later renamed the Sind, Punjab, and Delhi Railway company also had a large network
in the northwest connecting the port of Karachi. Connecting the main ports to the interior
and to each other was an important goal of colonial rail policy in keeping with Britain’s
military, political and trade interests in India.
These private British companies were joint stock companies and their contracts with
the Secretary of State shared common features. Land was provided free of cost by the
Government of India. The companies raised capital in Britain via shares and received a
5 percent guarantee on the share capital at a fixed exchange rate. The net earnings from
railway operations were paid into the Government treasury and rebated to the companies.
If net earnings as a proportion of capital outlay fell short of the guaranteed 5 percent, the
Government made up the difference up to 5 percent. However, such guarantee payments
were treated as debt. If annual returns exceeded 5 percent, the Government received half of
all surplus profits above the guarantee and shareholders received the other half. Once past
guarantee payments were paid off, company shareholders received all the profits.4
In exchange for the guarantees, the Government retained control over certain aspects
of the railways. The Government had ultimate authority on route placement and gauge.
They could also influence operations through a government director who sat on the com-
pany boards. Finally, the Government could purchase private railways on the 25th or 50th
anniversary of their original contract with the mean market value of the company’s stock
4See Sanyal (1930) for details.
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in the preceding three years determining the purchase price (Bell 1894, p. 66-72). This is
a key contractual feature from an identification perspective because the Government could
not time takeovers depending on company performance.
India’s experience with railway guarantees was mixed. While such contracts allowed
British capital to finance Indian railway construction, many of the companies were unable
to generate returns over 5 percent in the 1850s and 1860s. Hence, the Government and
Indian taxpayers made up the difference to British shareholders via guarantee payments
totaling almost 30 million pounds by 1869 (Hurd 1983). To put this in perspective, the
Government paid 1.72 million pounds in guarantees in 1869 which represented 20% of its
total spending on public works (Great Britain 1878). The Government also incurred losses
on account of the fixed exchange rate stipulated in the contracts. In the 1860s and 70s, the
rupee was worth no more than 1s. 8d while the contract rate for guarantee payments was
1s. 10d to the rupee. The devaluation amounted to approximately a 10% increase in real
payments collected by companies.
On account of the disappointing performance of the guaranteed railways, the Government
decided to construct and manage state owned railways in the 1870s. The Government
borrowed money on London capital markets in the form of Government of India bonds to
finance these projects. It was spurred by the lower cost of public borrowing. From 1860 to
1873 the yield on Government bonds averaged 4.6%, not much below the guarantees of 5%.
In the next 10 years from 1874 to 1883 the yield averaged 3.7%. This period of extensive
state construction largely ended in the early 1880s. The economic depression in the 1870s
coupled with the war in Afghanistan crowded out government spending on railways.
The question of whether guaranteed companies should be allowed to retain ownership
of the main trunk lines came to the forefront in the late 1870s with the approaching 25th
year anniversary of the East Indian railway in 1879. Years of guarantee payments and
a perception of poor performance turned many officials against the model of full private
ownership with guarantees (Sanyal 1930, Sweeney 2011). In 1877, the Secretary sent a
letter to the East Indian railway company directors indicating the Government’s intention
to purchase the line but suggested a new arrangement whereby the company would operate
the railway in exchange for a portion of the profits and a reduced guarantee (Huddleston,
1906 p. 101). Thus, the East Indian railway came under Government ownership in 1880
worked by the newly formed East Indian company, which retained one-fifth of the capital,
now guaranteed at 4 percent, and also received one fifth of surplus profits for working the
lines.
Over the 1880s, 1890s, and 1900s, the Government purchased all the original guaranteed
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companies. Most of them were taken over on the 25th year of their original contract, with
the exception of the Great Indian Peninsula, Bombay, Baroda and Central India, and the
Madras railway. These three were taken over on their 50th contract anniversary because of
a negotiated deal in 1869 with the Secretary of State in which their past guarantee debt
payments up to that year were forgiven in exchange for sharing surplus profits above 5
percent with the Government from that year forward. The Secretary also agreed to not
takeover these railways on their 25th anniversary.5
Following takeovers, the Government implemented one of two operational models. In
three cases, the Government chose to operate railways after takeovers.6 In the five other
cases, the Government entered into agreements with directors of the former railway com-
panies. The newly formed companies generally held less than 20 percent of the capital.
The profits were guaranteed, at lower rates of 3 to 4 percent and at smaller capital values.
Surplus profits were shared with the Government in proportion to their respective capital
shares.
To address the need for new railways, the Government relied on a public-private part-
nership model similar to the one negotiated with the guaranteed companies upon takeover.
Beginning in the mid-1880s, the Government entered into contracts with new private com-
panies whereby the state owned the railway but the company constructed and managed the
lines in exchange for a small portion of the surplus profits. The Government also supported
a few privately owned railways in the 1880s with state subsidies. Finally, a few Princely
States constructed and managed their own railways.7 Such railways (under Government
ownership, Princely State ownership or private ownership) constructed after the 1870s did
not experience any change in ownership.
The transition to state ownership between 1874 and 1912 was the key first step in India’s
move to complete nationalization of its railways.8 Our empirical analysis exploits Govern-
5This deal was offered only to the four biggest railways, these three plus the East Indian. However,
the East Indian refused the offer because it was a profitable company and its past debts on account of the
guarantee were small compared to the others. We believe railway fixed effects capture the differences in size
and any other time invariant factors that lead to these companies being taken over on their 50th anniversary.
6We do not study operations in detail because different reasons appear to have driven the operation
decision such as military concerns in one case versus private mis-management in another case. This potential
endogeneity combined with fewer operational switches in the data make it difficult to accurately identify
the effects of operation. Instead our focus is on the transition to majority Government ownership which was
common among all guaranteed railways.
7The Princely States represent a large number of semi-autonomous kingdoms ruled by native Indian
rulers in contrast to British India that was under direct colonial authority. In exchange for local autonomy,
the Princely States deferred to the British on matters of defense and foreign affairs.
8There was another important change beginning in the 1920s, when public opinion turned against private
operation and the Government gradually took over railway operations in the 1930s and 1940s.
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ment of India takeovers of guaranteed companies to identify the effects of state ownership on
productivity. In addition to the treatment group, the Indian context offers a control group
because many railways did not experience a change in ownership. While it has many advan-
tages from a research design perspective, the Indian context presents two challenges that we
address. First, the Government pushed a few mergers in the years immediately following
takeovers. For example, the private Sind, Punjab and Delhi Railway was merged with the
state owned Indus Valley and Punjab Northern lines upon takeover among other mergers.
To separate the confounding effects of mergers from takeovers, we construct a special ‘joint’
panel of railways described in the data section. Second, the timing of government takeovers
was different for railways who struck a deal with the Secretary of State in 1869. Hence we
test for differential effects between the late takeovers in the 1900s and the first wave in the
1880s.
Transitioning to Government ownership was a significant change because it increased
the Government’s control and supervision of railways. Huddleston’s (1906) history of the
East Indian railway discusses how directors had greater autonomy in developing the East
Indian’s network, in setting fares, and managing the stock of wagons prior to 1879 when it
was taken-over. Afterward, there were several controversial decisions in which the directors
had to acquiesce to Government demands on these issues. More generally, ownership had
the potential to influence many dimensions of productivity. For example, private company
directors or state officials in the Indian Civil Service made purchasing decisions about the
models of locomotives, wagons, and coaches, which likely influenced productivity. Directors
and officials decided whether to adopt expensive new technologies such as inter-locking sig-
naling systems and air vacuum brakes that improved safety. Owners designed compensation
packages for their employees. At the time, it was common for both private and state owned
railways to have a pension fund, in which employees and railways made joint contributions.
Perhaps the most important decision concerned the scale and design of the railway network.
A railway system that runs trains more frequently over its network will be more productive.
Such economies of density may also depend on ownership.
To the extent that ownership changed control rights, it could thus impact the productiv-
ity and efficiency of Indian railways. In the period we study, 1874 to 1912, Indian railways
witnessed tremendous productivity growth, averaging 2.3 percent per year. As we show else-
where, the aggregate productivity gains were not driven by reallocation within the railway
sector. Rather all Indian railways systems moved closer to the technology frontier in the
early twentieth century (Bogart and Chaudhary 2013). In the next section, we discuss the
theoretical literature on ownership and firm performance examining the implications for the
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Indian case.
3 Theory and its Application to Indian Railways
A vast theoretical literature in economics has studied the relationship between ownership
and performance with researchers making arguments both for and against state ownership.
In a classic paper, Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) highlight the differential ability of the
government to intervene in the production activities of private and public firms. In this
vein, researchers have argued that state ownership reduces performance because governments
generally cannot commit and thus they appropriate the surpluses associated with managerial
investments. The hold-up problem, as it is known, is one key reason why mangers in private
firms have stronger incentives to cut costs and improve efficiency (Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny
1997, Shleifer 1998). A different theoretical argument in favor of private ownership suggests
that state owned firms may promote political objectives over profit maximization. For
example, they may pursue schemes of greater employment or universal coverage of service
that are not necessarily efficient (Boyko, Shleifer, and Vishny 1996).
Some examples from the historical record raise doubts about these views in the Indian
case. Anecdotal evidence suggests the Government of India took an active interest in the
management of railways once they were state owned. For example, repairs to locomotives
and carriages were centralized in the Lahore workshop following the merger and reorgani-
zation of the Sind, Punjab, and Delhi Railway company with the Indus Valley and Punjab
Northern state lines in 1886. Concentrating the repair process in a single location con-
tributed to the use of more sophisticated technology and avoided the redundancy of having
three individual workshops in the region (Kerr 2007, p. 85). In another example Indian farm-
ers and merchants made requests to extend the network of the East Indian railway when
it was under state ownership into less populated regions and to expand its wagon stock
to handle exceptional periods of freight. The Government of India refused these requests
because they were considered uneconomical (Huddleston 1906). It could safely make such
choices because there were fewer political consequences from ignoring constituent demands
for an authoritarian government.
The Government also stood to benefit from a well functioning railway sector because of
its heavy fiscal reliance on railways. Almost 35 percent of Government gross revenues came
from state owned railways by 1912 (Great Britian 1922). In 1909 it was reported that the net
profits from railways were enough to meet all outstanding interest payments on Government
of India debt (Sweeney 2011, p. 170). The Government’s dependence on railway revenues
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was due to a weak tax system. Per capita taxes in British India were only 5 to 8 percent of
those in Britain (Roy 2011). The Government relied heavily on land taxes but was unable
to increase rates to capture changes in productivity and landed wealth. According to Roy
(2011), land taxes as a share of agricultural production declined from 10 percent in the 1850s
to under 5 percent in the 1930s (p. 256). Indian opposition to taxes made it difficult for the
colonial state to tap into new sources of tax revenue especially in the twentieth century and
the tax to GDP ratio continued to remain low up to independence. While this weak fiscal
system was undesirable from a development perspective, it may have provided a mitigating
factor for railway productivity.9
A different theoretical literature on regulation of utilities points to channels by which
private ownership can fail to achieve better firm performance. In practice subsidies or
guarantees to private companies are common in the infrastructure sector.10 They have been
studied in the theoretical literature especially when private firms require insurance against
downside demand risk, but their efforts in reducing costs are not readily observed.11 In such
contexts, Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2009, 2010) show that the optimal procurement
contract contains minimum revenue guarantees to mitigate risk, but they should not be too
generous as to induce sub-optimal cost-reducing effort.
The Indian case suggests the 5 percent dividend guarantee was perhaps too generous
and likely dulled company incentives to manage costs judiciously. Contemporaries often
criticized the guarantee system exactly for this reason. Horace Bell in his history of Indian
railways disapprovingly noted that “shareholders had their 5 percent whatever happened
(Bell 1894, p. 66).” The Secretary of State in 1868 advocated the use of guarantees, but
admitted, “the system tends to weaken the ordinary motives to efficient management and
superintendence (Bell 1894, p. 19).” A good example of wasteful spending is the East India
Company’s procurement of sleeper cars. Before its government takeover, it spent 52,000
pounds on iron sleepers when creosoted timber sleepers were likely to be just as durable and
cost about half as much (Sweeney 2011, p. 26).
Guarantees also have implications for capital investment and the scale of railway sys-
tems. As noted above the Government of India’s cost of borrowing was around 4.6% in the
1850s and 1860s when the guarantee contracts were signed. However, by the mid 1870s the
Government of India’s cost of borrowing was under 4% and by the 1880s it was under 3.5%.
9In theory, if the Government valued the public good benefits of railways more than other actors, then
its ownership could be considered optimal according to the property rights model developed by Besley and
Ghatak (2001).
10Guarantees to private companies were commonly offered during the historical era of railway construction
(Eichengreen 1995).
11See Martimort (2006), Auriol and Picard (2009), Estache and Wren-Lewis (2009).
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It no longer made sense to guarantee railways a 5% return when the return on capital in
India had fallen to less than 3.5%. The problem was magnified by the requirement that
guarantee payments must be made at the exchange rate of the 1850s, even though the In-
dian Rupee had depreciated relative to the pound sterling by the 1870s. The Government
of India perhaps responded by limiting the capital investments of guaranteed railways. One
potential mechanism was to restrict the network expansion of existing guaranteed railways
and build new state owned lines. A good example is the Indian Midland railway which was
built at the edges of the Great Indian Peninsula railway’s network when it was still private.
The Indian Midland railway company operated the line at a guarantee of 4%. If the Great
Indian Peninsula would have built the line the Government would have had to pay its usual
guarantee of 5%.
To summarize, the standard models, which assume that state owned firms do not maxi-
mize profits or have weaker incentives than private companies, do not appear to be a good
description of Indian railways. Similar to other contexts, we believe the question of whether
state ownership influenced the productivity of Indian railways is an empirical one and we
use detailed data from this period to answer the question.
4 Data
Our dataset builds on earlier work (Bogart and Chaudhary 2013), which constructed new
consistent series on output, labor, capital and fuel for the major standard and meter gauge
railways operating in India between 1874 and 1912.12 The sources for the data include the
annual Report to the Secretary of State for India in Council on Railways in India, published
from 1860 to 1883 and the Administration Reports on the Railways in India, published from
1884 to 1912. These series report information on passenger miles, tons miles, fuel, labor, the
value of capital, fares and the ownership structure of each railway. We begin by describing
our unit of analysis followed by the construction of the main variables used in the regressions.
Our analysis follows a railway or railway system, which includes the main line accounting
for more than 90 percent of the mileage on average and any secondary lines operated by the
system that are owned either by the Government of India, private companies or Princely
12We begin the analysis in 1874 when the official documents begin reporting consistent output and input
data. As is the common in the transportation literature, our measure of output is a weighted average of
passenger miles (number of passengers carried 1 mile) and ton miles with cost elasticities serving as the
weights. We direct the interested reader to Bogart and Chaudhary (2013) that describes in detail how
we constructed the output and input series.In that paper we used individual-railway data to estimate the
aggregate performance of Indian railways and compared it to other sectors of the Indian economy.
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States.13 Ideally, we would like to follow this railway system for the entire time period but
mergers between lines complicate the process. To address the issue of mergers, we follow a
railway system and include information on the pre-merged lines to each system before they
are officially merged together.14 We call this our ‘joint’ panel of railways. By following a
consistent joint panel of 20 railway systems, mergers are less likely to confound our results
on state ownership. As a robustness check, we also follow a ‘solo’ panel of railways where
each system enters as a separate observation even if it goes on to merge to another system
in future years.
We use information from the Reports on the timing of state takeovers to construct an
indicator variable for state ownership, which switches to one in the first year the state
becomes the majority owner of the main railway and remains one for the rest of the time
period. The main lines on average represent the majority of total mileage but our railway
systems also include a small mileage of lines that may be under different ownership from the
main line. As a robustness check, we also construct the fraction of miles within a system
that are state owned.
We focus on two measures of total factor productivity (TFP). Our first TFP measure is
the commonly used Index Number approach where TFP is the difference between output
growth and a weighted average of the growth of the inputs namely capital, labor and fuel.
The weights are the share of total costs paid to each input. We do not observe these cost
shares but the Reports suggest working costs accounted for 45 percent of total revenues on
average from 1882 to 1912, implying 55 percent of revenues were paid to capital. We rely on
evidence from the East Indian railway to determine the split between labor and fuel where
labor costs were two-thirds of working expenses (Derbyshire 1987). This implies a capital
cost share of 0.55, labor 0.3, and fuel 0.15. These shares are in line with historical studies
on railway productivity.15
The Index Number method assumes constant returns to scale and perfect competition
that are perhaps problematic in the railway context because many railways could operate as
13For example, the East Indian railway system operated the primary East Indian line owned by the East
Indian railway company up to 1879 and the Government from 1880 onwards, three state-owned lines, and
by 1912 three lines owned by other companies. For railways that manage multiple lines, the railway system
is the most consistent unit we can follow because the data are reported for the system. When the railway
does not operate secondary lines, the unit of analysis is the railway.
14The only exceptions are the break up of East Coast State railways in 1900 and the re-organization of
Madras, Southern Mahratta and South Indian railways in 1908. East Coast railway began operations in
1895. In 1900, part of the railway was merged with Madras and another section was merged with Bengal
Nagpur making it difficult to accurately assign the pre-merger information.
15For example, Crafts, Mills, and Mulatu (2007) assume a 0.63 share for capital, 0.34 for labor, and 0.03
for fuel on British railways. Fishlow (1966) assumes shares of 0.52, 0.38, and 0.1 for capital, labor, and fuel
respectively on U.S. railroads.
13
monopolies in their geographic location and exhibit scale economies. Hence, we also use TFP
estimates derived from regression analysis. The main concern in parametric estimations of
TFP is generating unbiased estimates of input elasticities. If input choices are correlated
with unobserved productivity shocks i.e., simultaneity problem, then the coefficients on the
input elasticities are biased. For example, firms with positive productivity shocks may use
more inputs making it difficult to separate the effects of inputs from productivity shocks.
One solution is the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimator, which uses intermediate
inputs such as fuel, materials and electricity to address the simultaneity problem.16 The
key assumption underlying the LP method is that of monotonicity.17 More productive
firms should produce more output using more of the intermediate input, fuel in our case,
conditional on capital. We believe this is a reasonable assumption even though Indian
railways were not a perfectly competitive industry. The main reason more productive firms
would use less fuel would be if they had access to more fuel-efficient technology not captured
in capital. Based on our reading, it is not clear which type of railway technology would
achieve lower fuel outside of new locomotives or wagons which are included in capital. More
generally in railways it is hard to imagine carrying more passengers and freight without
running more trains and using more fuel. The LP method also assumes capital is a function
of investment decisions made in earlier periods and hence is uncorrelated with unobserved
productivity shocks in the current period. Again, this is a reasonable assumption in our
context because railway capital clearly evolved from investment decisions made in past
years.
Using the LP method, we first estimate the coefficients on capital, fuel and labor.18 Then
we calculate the log of individual railway TFP as follows:
tfpit = yit − (α̂0 + α̂llit + α̂kkit + α̂mmit)
where α̂’s are the estimated parameters. In addition to these two measures of TFP, we
study the effects of state ownership on partial productivity measures namely capital, fuel
and labor productivity, investment, the capital-labor ratio and average passenger and freight
fares (the sum received for carrying one passenger one mile or one ton of goods one mile).19
Table 1A reports summary statistics for the main variables in the joint panel. TFP is
16Other solutions proposed to this problem such as in Blundell and Bond (2000) are not suitable for our
context of small N and large T.
17In the LP framework, the intermediate input, fuel in our case, is expressed as a function of capital and
the endogenous portion of the error term (the unobserved productivity shock correlated with input choices).
Assuming monoticity allows an inversion of the demand function for fuel whereby the endogeneous error
term is now expressed as a function of fuel and capital.
18In Bogart and Chaudhary (2013), we find large and positive correlations between different methods of
estimating railway-level TFP such as the LP, IN and FE.
19The data on fares are reported from 1880-1912.
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the most important and it increased rapidly for most railways. To illustrate the trend figure
2 shows an index of the output-weighted average of railway TFP in each year beginning in
1874. Industry TFP was very volatile in the late 1870s on account of the severe famines in
1877 highlighting how macro events influenced railways. Average TFP growth changes from
being stagnant in the 1890s to accelerating at a very fast pace in the 1900s. While these
productivity gains were evident for most railways, there were important differences in levels
across railways as reflected by the standard deviation.
Another important variable is the indicator for state ownership. Figure 3 shows the
fraction of total railway miles in our sample by ownership. While guaranteed companies
accounted for most of the total mileage in the 1870s at over 90 percent in 1874, their
share declined to 0 by 1908 when the last guaranteed company (Madras Railway company)
was taken over. As private guaranteed mileage decreased, there was a parallel increase in
Government of India owned mileage from less than 10 percent in 1874 to over 70 percent
by 1912. The remaining miles were owned by a small number of second generation private
assisted companies formed in the 1880s and 1890s accounting for less than 10 percent by
1912. Finally, the Princely State owned railways accounted for just over 10 percent of the
mileage by 1912.
In table 1B we present the summary statistics of the main variables separately for switch-
ing and non-switching railways. There are no significant differences in TFP, capital and fuel
productivity between the two types of railways. Switching railways are bigger in size (in-
vestment), which stems from mergers after takeover as described above. They also have
higher labor productivity than non-switching railways that were mostly under state own-
ership for the entire time period. Again, this difference is not too surprising. If we focus
only on the pre-treatment period, switching railways have higher labor productivity and
capital-labor ratios. But, there are no significant differences in TFP, capital productivity
and fuel productivity. We find it reassuring that the TFP is similar across the two groups in
the pre-treatment period, which suggests TFP changes in the non-switching railways pro-
vide a decent counter factual for switching railways. In the next section we describe our
methodology, which moves beyond cross-sectional comparisons to changes within the same
railway company.
5 Empirical Framework
Much of the recent literature on ownership and firm performance has studied the transition
to private ownership because many countries have moved away from state owned enterprises
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to private firms in the last four decades. These studies of privatization encompass firms in
post Communist transition economies (review by Estrin et. al. 2009), in Latin American
countries (Anuatti-Neto et al. 2004, Galiani et al. 2004) and even in China where state firms
have adopted elements of private ownership (Li 1997, Dong, Putterman and Unel 2006).
The early works in this literature were cross-sectional comparisons between private and
state owned firms controlling for other factors influencing productivity and ownership. For
example, Boardman and Vining (1989) compared the performance of state owned enter-
prises to private firms across 500 large non-industrial firms with operations outside the
United States in 1983. Using a single cross-section of firms to identify the effects of owner-
ship structure is problematic because of omitted variables. Private firms are not randomly
assigned and differ from state owned firms. Hence it is difficult to disentangle the effect of
ownership from other variables that systematically vary by ownership.
An important step forward was seminal work by Megginson, Netter, and Randenborgh
(1994) that compared the pre and post privatization performance of a sample of 61 firms
across many countries and industries. They estimated pre-privatization means averaged over
three years before an ownership change for return on sales, net income efficiency and capital
expenditure among other measures. They compared this mean to the post-privatization
mean again averaged over three years after privatization.
Comparing the before and after performance of the same firm was a major advance over
across firm comparisons. But, two issues still remained. One, the short before and after
time period may be insufficient to identify changes in firm performance that develop after
three years. For example, Megginson, Netter and Randenborgh find privatization does not
increase unemployment. However, it is possible recently privatized firms need a few years
to identify which set of employees to lay off. More importantly, there may be other changes
in the macro-economy apart from privatization, which would confound causal estimates of
privatization. For example, privatization in Central and Eastern Europe was accompanied
by an increase in international trade, improvements in market institutions, and other macro
reforms (Estrin et al. 2009).
The natural step forward has been a difference-in-difference research design where the
before-after performance of treatment firms is compared to the before-after performance of
control firms that do not experience ownership changes in the same period. We believe
Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2006) have set the ‘gold standard’ in executing such an analysis.
Using detailed data on manufacturing firms in Hungary, Romania, Russia and Ukraine from
1985 to 2002, the authors compare multifactor productivity before and after privatization
within firms relative to before-after changes in firms that do not experience privatization.
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Unlike other studies, they exploit a longer panel of firms to identify the effects of privatiza-
tion. Borrowing from labor econometrics techniques, they are also the first in this literature
to account for firm-specific trends and model anticipation effects whereby treatment firms
respond differentially in the pre-treatment period. Our paper uses similar techniques to
estimate the effect of state ownership in the context of Indian railways.
We begin by implementing a simple reduced form framework shown below.
yit = α + βStateOwnershipit+δi + γt + λiY ear + εit
Here yit captures railway level outcomes such as TFP (IN or LP), partial input productivity,
investment, the capital-labor ratio and fares. StateOwnership is a dummy for when private
railways came under Government of India ownership. Our panel of railways includes both
switchers and non-switchers that remain state owned or native state owned throughout the
period of study. In our joint panel we are comparing the average change in performance for
8 switchers relative to 12 non-switchers. We also include a robust set of fixed effects. We
exploit within railway variation by including railway fixed effects, δi. We control for annual
macro-economic or other temporal shocks that may influence railways in the same manner
by including year fixed effects, γt.
Following Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2006), we include interaction terms between a
time trend and an indicator for each railway, λiY ear, to control for unobservable trends
at the railway level. If a railway that was to be purchased by the Government was on a
different trend from a non-switching railway, then the estimated coefficients would be biased.
Controlling for railway specific trends alleviates such concerns. It allows us to identify the
effects of state ownership by comparing deviations in TFP from the railway trend before
and after the change to state ownership within a railway system. Lastly, the standard errors
are clustered at the railway level to address potential serial correlation in the data.20
Our institutional background offers two key advantages vis-à-vis identifying the effects
of ownership. First, the state took over all the original private guaranteed companies, which
reduces selection concerns that the state was taking over only the most profitable companies.
Second, the Government could not time the takeovers to periods of low or high productivity
because the takeover dates were determined decades in advance. The Government could
only takeover firms on the 25th or 50th anniversary of their original contracts. Although this
20In our context, we have 20 clusters that may be too small to generate reliable clustered standard errors.
The main concern with few clusters is that the clustered standard errors may be biased down and studies
are more likely to reject the null when in fact it is true (i.e., Type 1 errors). In a robustness check, we
estimate p-values with wild bootstrap as suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) to address the
problem of few clusters. Our findings are essentially the same so we report the clustered standard errors
throughout.
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suggests the state could not endogenously time takeovers, it raises concerns that private
firms may have anticipated and reacted in advance to state takeovers.
To investigate such anticipation effects, we estimate the dynamics of state ownership by
interacting a dummy for state ownership with a three-year bin before takeover. We focus
on the three year window because the price at takeover was determined by the average
stock price of the railway over the three years before takeover. Private railways were taken
over in different years during our period of study and so we observe them for a different
number of pre and post years. Fortunately, we observe all the railways for three years pre
and post takeover, which ensures we are studying a balanced panel during those windows.
We also investigate differences between the short and long run dynamics of state takeovers
by interacting state ownership with a three year window after takeover including the year
of takeover plus one and two years after takeover (short run effect), and with years three
and beyond after takeover (long run effect).
6 Results
6.1 TFP and Partial Productivity
Table 2A presents our first set of results on the relationship between state ownership and
productivity in the long run. Panel A captures the change in ownership with a simple
dummy variable for when majority of the mileage came under Government ownership. We
find no significant long run negative effect of state ownership on either measure of total
factor productivity. The coefficient on state ownership in the case of TFP-LP is very close
to zero: a positive and insignificant effect of 0.4 percent following state takeovers. Since the
Levinsohn-Petrin TFP estimate addresses potential endogeneity of input choices, we prefer
LP to the Index Number estimate. That said, we present results on both TFP measures to
highlight that our findings are similar regardless of the metric used. In the case of TFP-IN,
the coefficient on state ownership suggests a negative effect of -2.4 percent, but is statistically
insignificant.
Apart from TFP, we also study partial productivity in table 2A. Mirroring the TFP
results, we find no significant effects of state ownership on labor, capital or fuel productivity.
The coefficient on state ownership is positive but insignificant for labor productivity (this is
contrary to the findings of many privatization studies as we discuss below).The coefficient on
fuel productivity is small and insignificant, while that on capital is negative but insignificant.
Panel B uses the fraction of state owned miles to measure the switch in ownership and
essentially finds the same results. An increase in the fraction of state owned miles has no
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significant negative effect on either TFP or partial productivity of labor, capital and fuel.21
Since state takeovers in a few cases were immediately followed by important railway
mergers, we prefer the joint panel because it maintains a constant unit of analysis and
therefore separates the effects of state ownership from mergers. But, as a robustness check
we replicate the analysis from table 2A on the solo panel of railway systems. These re-
sults are presented in table 2B. The coefficients on state ownership are slightly larger but
never significant, and confirm our main findings of no negative effects of state ownership on
productivity. We have subjected the findings to many robustness checks such as weighted
regressions and alternate estimates of TFP, but state ownership never has a significant
negative effect on productivity.22
Although tables 2A and 2B establish state ownership of Indian railways did not reduce
productivity on average following takeovers, the exercise does not reveal anything about the
short and long run dynamics. Such dynamics are relevant for two reasons. First, it is possible
state ownership has differential effects on productivity depending on the time horizon. If
a state struggles to manage newly acquired enterprises in the short run, productivity may
be negative in the years immediately following a takeover. But, if a state overcomes these
challenges, productivity may return to or even exceed pre takeover levels in the long run.
These two effects could offset each other leading to an insignificant average effect. One could
also imagine the opposite scenario.
Second and more importantly, firms can anticipate ownership changes and react to them
before a takeover. The Government of India could not time takeovers but companies could
anticipate the takeover and respond in the preceding years. Anticipation effects complicate
the interpretation of state ownership. If firms begin responding to a potential takeover 2
to 3 years prior to the actual takeover, then we may want to compare the TFP under state
ownership to TFP some years prior to takeover.
To test for dynamics, figure 4 plots the coefficients on state ownership interacted with -3,
-2, -1 years before takeover and 1, 2, 3, and up to 10 years after takeover. These coefficients
are from a regression on TFP-LP in the joint panel including railway FE, year FE and
railway specific trends. Although we show estimates for 10 years after takeover, we believe
the three year before and after window is the easiest to interpret because we observe all
the switching railways in this window and our panel is balanced. The coefficients are all
21Since we find statistically insignificant effects of state ownership, we are less concerned about Type 1
errors stemming from 20 clusters, fewer than the 30 which is considered ideal to generate reliable clustered
standard errors. As suggested by Cameron, Gellbach and Miller (2008), we estimate p-values with wild
bootstrap. The wild bootstrap p-values also find state ownership had no significant impact on TFP and
partial productivity of labor, capital and fuel.
22These results are available upon request.
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insignificant as seen by the wide confidence intervals. TFP did not change significantly
in the years before and after a state takeover. It hovers around zero, increasing slightly
in the years up to takeover and then decreasing slightly in the years after. The long run
view suggests TFP decreases up to year 6 and then begins to increase. We are cautious
putting too much weight on this long run pattern because the coefficients are statistically
insignificant and we observe only 6 of the 8 switching railways in the 5 to 10 year window
after takeover.
Table 3 presents results on such dynamics creating bins for the three years before
takeover, for the year of takeover plus the next two years, and a final bin for years 3 or
more after takeover. We find no significant difference between the short run and long run
effects of state ownership. For example, in the case of TFP-LP the coefficients are small
and insignificant in both cases. The coefficients on the three year window before takeover
are also insignificant for the most part. There is a mild anticipation effect for TFP-IN but
this does not change the findings on state ownership post takeover. Broadly, these results
suggest state ownership did not have differential effects in the short run and anticipation
effects are not driving the findings.
There may be some concern that we are not picking up any anticipation effects because
they were relevant for only a few firms. Based on the institutional history, we believe only
certain firms could have anticipated state takeovers with a reasonable amount of certainty.
The East Indian was the first company acquired by the Government of India in 1879 and
a lot of uncertainty surrounded this takeover (Huddleston 1906). Firms such as Eastern
Bengal, Sind, Punjab and Delhi, Oudh and Rohilkhand, and South Indian were in the next
set of takeovers in the 1880s shortly after the East Indian. Similar to the East Indian, it was
still unclear if the Government was going to takeover these companies or adopt an alternate
policy. However, after these takeovers in the 1880s, the Great Indian Peninsula, Madras,
and Bombay, Baroda and Central India railways were less uncertain about their future when
their contracts came due in the 1900s. Recall these three railways were associated with the
1869 deal with the Secretary of State. We would expect anticipation effects to be most
relevant for this group of railways because their probability of takeover was high given the
Government’s past behavior.
To test whether anticipation effects were indeed larger for the ‘Deal of 1869’ railways
, we interact a dummy for these three systems with the same before and after bins as in
table 3. We find no evidence of a significant differential anticipation effect for these firms
in the three years before takeover (see table 4).23 Moreover, there are no differential effects
23There is weak evidence for an absolute anticipation effect for GIPR, Madras and BB&CI railways in
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of state ownership on TFP for this group. There is one interesting difference between
railway systems purchased in the 1870s and 1880s versus in the 1900s. In the former, capital
productivity declines substantially in the first three years after takeover, but for the latter
capital productivity does not decline and even shows a positive trend (albeit insignificant).
It is possible that early takeovers were associated with some misallocation of capital, but
there was some learning which minimized the later effects.
It is useful to point out how our estimates compare with the literature. Most privatization
studies find a positive effect on firm performance following a switch to private ownership
on the order of 20 percent (Gureiv and Megginson 2007). Applying these findings to a
nationalization suggests state ownership should reduce firm performance by 20 percent on
average. Even the lower end of the 95 percent confidence interval on our state ownership
coefficients does not produce negative effects of that magnitude. Rather, state ownership in
the worst case could have reduced TFP by -13 percent (TFP-IN) or -7 percent (TFP-LP).
These are the low end of the 95 percent confidence interval on the estimates presented in table
2A. It is also interesting that our coefficient on state ownership is positive but insignificant
for labor productivity contrary to the findings of many privatization studies where a change
from state to private ownership improves labor productivity. For example, Ramamurti
(1997) estimates that labor productivity increased by 370% following the privatization of
Argentine railways in the early 1990s.
Colonial India was a British colony, not a democracy. This suggests our estimates are
perhaps more comparable to studies in non-democratic settings. Given this benchmark, the
findings are less surprising. For example, Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2006) find negative
and insignificant effects of privatization in Russia in similar models with firm fixed effects
and firm specific trends. In fact, their best case scenario suggests privatization could have
increased TFP by 5.3 percent.24 This is similar to our worst case impact of -7 percent
following nationalization above. In Singapore, Feng, Sun and Tong (2004) find small and
statistically insignificant differences between 30 government-linked companies and a matched
sample of non government-linked companies. Surprisingly the coefficients on an indicator
variable for government-linked companies are positive, though insignificant, for efficiency
and leverage measures. The historical example of Indian railways combined with firms
in contemporary Russia and Singapore highlight that nationalizations are not necessarily
inefficient and privatizations are not necessarily efficient. The incentives of the state and
the solo panel. The sum of the dummy variables for state ownership and the interaction with deal of 1869
railways is negative and marginally significant at the 10 percent level but only in the three years prior to
takeover.
24The upper end of the 95 percent confidence interval on the estimates for Russia in Table 5, FE&FT.
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firm are critical for performance.
Contemporary China offers another comparison, a non-democratic setting where the
state has introduced elements of private ownership in state-owned enterprises. The findings
from these studies are mixed. Some suggest positive effects of ownership reform towards
privatization of as large as 30 percent on the growth of TFP (Dong, Putterman and Unel
2006). Others find insignificant differences in productivity between private domestic and
state owned firms in fixed effects models (Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Perkins 2006). The diver-
sity of estimates is due to different methods and data sources.25 It is unsurprising then that
the Indian findings generally lie within the range of estimates for China.
6.2 Investment, Capital-Labor Ratio and Fares
We explore the effects of state ownership on other indicators of railway operations in this
sub-section. One explanation for why state ownership of Indian railways did not negatively
influence productivity is that the operation of railways was similar under the two regimes.
To assess this conjecture, we test whether the change to state ownership changed investment
decisions, the mix of capital to labor, and average fares to passengers and freight.
Panel A in table 5 presents the results on the long run effects of state ownership for both
the solo and joint panels. In the solo panel of railways, we find investment increased on
average under state ownership. This increase is driven by key mergers that occurred in the
years immediately following state takeovers. We find no significant effect of state ownership
on investment in the joint panel, which accounts for mergers by joining the information of
pre-merged lines in the years before they merge. Thus, the Government of India increased
investment via mergers under state ownership, but this did not lead to greater investment
in the regional railway networks that were formed. One might expect that the increase in
scale that we observe in the solo panel after state takeovers contributed to higher TFP. But,
it did not because we observe similar results on TFP across the solo and joint panels (see
tables 2A and 2B). The reason is that Indian railways did not exhibit economies of scale
in this period. Our estimates of the railway production function do not reject constant
returns (see Bogart and Chaudhary 2013). In unreported specifications, we tested whether
there were differential effects of state ownership for railways near other companies that were
state-owned. There was no evidence of such differential effects. We also found no differential
effects of state ownership on density defined as train miles run divided by track mileage.26
25See the discussion in Estrin et al. 2007 for details. They indicate that few studies use panel data on
switching and non-switching firms.
26Results available upon request.
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Specifications 3 and 4 focus on the capital-labor ratio. Here we observe a large, positive
and significant effect of state ownership in both panels. Under Government ownership,
capital-labor ratios increased by 10 percent in the joint panel. This effect is not driven by
anticipation effects as seen in the dynamic specifications (panel B) and is not a short run
phenomenon. The coefficient on state ownership 3 or more years after takeover is large and
statistically significant (specification 4). We know from earlier work (Bogart and Chaudhary
2012) that labor conditional on fixed inputs (miles, locomotives and vehicles) declined under
state ownership in India. These findings on the capital-labor ratio match those results.
It may come as a surprise to many readers that the growth rate of capital outpaced the
growth rate of labor under Government ownership. Many privatization studies find that
capital-labor ratios increase under private ownership contrary to our results here (see the
review by Guriev and Megginson 2007). We think two factors account for this finding. First,
government takeovers reduced or eliminated guarantees which had the effect of lowering the
price of capital. Second, the Government of India represented the interests of a colonial
state and was not accountable to the Indian population. Similar to private firms, the state
could hire and fire labor without political repercussions at least in our period of study. This
may account for why the Government chose not to increase labor relative to capital unlike
recent governments that are often beholden to labor unions for political power.
Specifications 5 to 8 test the effects of ownership on average passenger and freight fares.
Similar to the findings on productivity, we find no significant change in fares following the
transition to state ownership. The coefficients on state ownership, especially in the joint
panel, are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. Accounting for anticipation ef-
fects or dynamics in panel B does not change the picture. The contracts with the guaranteed
companies stipulated that firms could set fares only within Government approved minimum
and maximum guidelines. It may well be the case that such guidelines forced companies
to charge users similar to what the Government would have charged. The fares results
also show that the Government of India was unwilling to push down rates and undermine
profitability. Given that TFP did not increase with ownership the Government could lower
fares only at the cost of profits. Given its fiscal reliance on railways, this would have been
a costly decision.
7 Conclusion
A large literature in economics has debated the appropriate ownership structure of firms
with the theoretical literature largely highlighting the negative effect of state ownership on
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productive efficiency. In this paper, we use history to examine a context where identifica-
tion is more robust compared to other contexts. Our results show there was no negative
effect of Government of India ownership on railway TFP, or capital and labor productivity.
Government ownership increased the operating scale of railway systems and contributed to
a more capital intensive operation of railways, but neither of these changes negatively influ-
enced TFP. The results may appear surprising to some readers in view of standard models
of public and private ownership. But, they are consistent with a small number of empirical
studies that find limited evidence of negative effects of state ownership.
Two key features of the Indian context are important for understanding our results. First,
the Government of India had strong fiscal incentives to maintain the productivity of railways
and their colonial authority allowed them to enact changes similar to private companies.
The Government was not encumbered by constituent demands for high employment and
redundant services. Although it is certainly not a model for development, the Government’s
structure was not inconsistent with a productive operation of state-owned railways. A
broader lesson is that the efficacy of state ownership often depends on institutions. Under
some conditions state owned firms can operate like private firms and create similar incentive
structures for employees.
Second, private railways in India were regulated and subsidized through guarantees. The
high-powered incentives often associated with private ownership were weakened in India.
Despite our historical lens, the Indian model of private ownership with subsidies is not
exceptional in industries with heavy capital investment. For example, government subsidies
and guarantees are common when the private sector plays a role in infrastructure provision.
Foster and Yepes (2006) find that in a worldwide sample of 132 water utilities, 39 percent
rely entirely on subsidies and another 30 percent only partially recover their operating or
capital costs through user-fees. Foster and Briceno-Garmendia (2009) estimate that in Sub-
Saharan Africa the electricity sector recovers 75 percent of its costs from user-fees and the
water and sanitation sector recovers about 64 percent of its costs. Just two years ago, Britain
agreed to a multi billion subsidy to a foreign company to construct its first nuclear power
plant (Wintour 2013).27 As quoted by journalist Patrick Wintour, “The guaranteed subsidies
promised by the government for Hinkley Point C will lead to accusations that ministers are
loading a further cost on spiraling energy prices by again requiring British taxpayers to
subsidize nuclear power. The coalition counters that similar subsidies are going to other
carbon-free industries such as renewables and that the country needs the energy security
and steady base load that nuclear provides.”
27See http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/oct/20/nuclear-power-station-hinkley-edf
24
In the historical railway era and today, government guarantees arise because contracts
are incomplete and private firms will require some insurance against demand risk before
investing. The downside is such guarantees encourage moral hazard problems and can
lead to poor operational performance. In many industries, like railways, the debate is not
between a theoretical public or private firm in an unregulated market, but rather between
state ownership and private ownership with subsidies and regulation. In these settings,
private ownership is perhaps less productive than say in manufacturing where firms are
less likely to be compensated with subsidies. In conclusion, we believe the debate on the
appropriate organizational form for efficiency will likely continue as theory and empirics
are suggesting that private ownership with government assistance can yield better or worse
performance in different informational and institutional environments.
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Table 1A: Summary Statistics (Joint Panel 1874-1912)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
(logs)
TFP (IN) 637 4.49 0.35 3.10 5.36
TFP (LP) 637 8.35 0.24 6.87 9.07
Labor Prod. 637 9.66 0.40 7.41 10.64
Capital Prod. 637 0.64 0.43 -1.44 1.60
Fuel Prod. 637 8.29 0.26 6.77 9.30
Capital/Labor 637 9.02 0.32 7.63 10.61
Investment per 1M Rupees 619 5.71 10.67 -36.83 137.45
Avg. Passenger Fare (pies) 545 2.51 0.45 1.54 8.07
Avg. Freight Fare (pies) 545 7.30 2.44 3.08 20.17
State Ownership 637 71.74% 45.06% 0.00% 100.00%
Fraction State Ownership 637 50.57% 42.92% 0.00% 100.00%
Source: See text for details.
The fare data are reported only from 1880-1912.
35
Table 1B: Summary Statistics for Switching
and Non-Switching Railways (Joint Panel)
Panel A: Entire Time Period 1874-1912
Non-Switching Switching Di↵
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
(logs)
TFP (IN) 4.46 0.40 4.53 0.29 -0.0644*
TFP (LP) 8.35 0.27 8.34 0.20 0.01
Labor Prod. 9.55 0.45 9.76 0.32 -0.208***
Capital Prod. 0.63 0.49 0.65 0.36 -0.0135
Fuel Prod. 8.31 0.30 8.28 0.21 0.0369
Capital-Labor Ratio 8.92 0.34 9.12 0.26 -0.195***
Investment per 1M Rupees 4.13 7.35 7.27 13.06 -3.136***
Observation 332 312
Panel B: Pre-Treatment Period Only
Non-Switching Switching Di↵
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
(logs)
TFP (IN) 4.32 0.44 4.37 0.27 -0.0494
TFP (LP) 8.34 0.35 8.31 0.21 0.0238
Labor Prod. 9.34 0.52 9.63 0.33 -0.294***
Capital Prod. 0.49 0.50 0.44 0.33 0.0512
Fuel Prod. 8.33 0.36 8.26 0.21 0.0710*
Capital-Labor Ratio 8.85 0.36 9.19 0.29 -0.345***
Investment per 1M Rupees 3.96 6.94 4.22 11.37 -0.266
Observation 149 152
Source: See text for details. Di↵erences are statistically significant at * p<0.05, **
p<0.01, *** p<0.001. To calculate the pre-treatment mean for non-switching railways,
we assign 1896 as the switching year, which is the mean takeover year among the switching
railways.
36
T
a
b
le
2
A
:
L
o
n
g
R
u
n
E
↵
e
c
ts
o
f
S
ta
te
O
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
o
n
P
ro
d
u
c
ti
v
it
y
,
J
o
in
t
P
a
n
e
l
L
o
g
T
F
P
(L
P
)
T
F
P
(I
N
)
L
a
b
o
r
P
ro
d
.
C
a
p
it
a
l
P
ro
d
.
F
u
el
P
ro
d
.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
S
ta
te
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
0.
00
4
4
-0
.0
2
4
2
0
.0
3
5
9
-0
.0
6
3
1
-0
.0
0
1
6
[0
.0
39
5
]
[0
.0
5
2
9
]
[0
.0
6
1
1
]
[0
.0
6
25
]
[0
.0
4
3
2
]
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
63
7
6
3
7
6
3
7
6
3
7
6
3
7
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0.
60
6
0
.8
5
2
0
.7
6
4
0
.8
64
0
.5
4
9
F
ra
ct
io
n
S
ta
te
-O
w
n
ed
0.
02
0
5
-0
.0
0
4
0
0
.0
5
9
0
-0
.0
4
35
0
.0
1
5
0
M
il
es
[0
.1
15
2
]
[0
.1
0
8
8
]
[0
.1
1
8
7
]
[0
.1
1
1
9
]
[0
.1
2
1
2
]
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
63
7
6
3
7
6
3
7
6
3
7
6
3
7
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0.
60
6
0
.8
5
2
0
.7
6
4
0
.8
63
0
.5
4
9
R
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
ra
il
w
ay
-l
ev
el
in
b
ra
ck
et
s.
**
*
p
<
0.
01
,
**
p
<
0.
05
,
*
p
<
0.
1
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
ra
il
w
ay
F
E
,
ye
a
r
F
E
,
a
n
d
ra
il
w
ay
sp
ec
ifi
c
tr
en
d
.
37
T
a
b
le
2
B
:
L
o
n
g
R
u
n
E
↵
e
c
ts
o
f
S
ta
te
O
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
o
n
P
ro
d
u
c
ti
v
it
y
,
S
o
lo
P
a
n
e
l
L
o
g
T
F
P
(L
P
)
T
F
P
(I
N
)
L
a
b
o
r
P
ro
d
.
C
a
p
it
a
l
P
ro
d
.
F
u
el
P
ro
d
.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
S
ta
te
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
-0
.0
4
2
0
-0
.0
3
4
2
0
.0
7
2
6
-0
.0
9
1
2
-0
.0
3
9
3
[0
.0
56
3
]
[0
.0
5
7
3
]
[0
.0
6
1
5
]
[0
.0
6
90
]
[0
.0
4
6
5
]
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
74
4
7
4
4
7
4
4
7
4
4
7
4
4
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0.
86
7
0
.8
8
2
0
.7
9
7
0
.8
93
0
.6
4
0
F
ra
ct
io
n
S
ta
te
-O
w
n
ed
-0
.0
1
9
6
-0
.0
0
9
1
0
.0
7
3
6
-0
.0
5
96
0
.0
1
0
8
M
il
es
[0
.1
06
5
]
[0
.1
0
8
4
]
[0
.1
1
2
7
]
[0
.1
1
6
1
]
[0
.1
1
1
6
]
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
74
4
7
4
4
7
4
4
7
4
4
7
4
4
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0.
86
7
0
.8
8
1
0
.7
9
6
0
.8
92
0
.6
3
9
R
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
ra
il
w
ay
-l
ev
el
in
b
ra
ck
et
s.
**
*
p
<
0.
01
,
**
p
<
0.
05
,
*
p
<
0.
1
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
ra
il
w
ay
F
E
,
ye
a
r
F
E
,
a
n
d
ra
il
w
ay
sp
ec
ifi
c
tr
en
d
.
38
T
a
b
le
3
:
D
y
n
a
m
ic
E
↵
e
c
ts
o
f
S
ta
te
O
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
o
n
P
ro
d
u
c
ti
v
it
y
,
J
o
in
t
P
a
n
e
l
L
o
g
T
F
P
(L
P
)
T
F
P
(I
N
)
L
a
b
o
r
P
ro
d
.
C
a
p
it
a
l
P
ro
d
.
F
u
el
P
ro
d
.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
S
ta
te
*-
3
to
-1
ye
ar
s
b
ef
or
e
ta
ke
ov
er
-0
.0
3
0
8
-0
.0
5
5
7
*
-0
.0
3
1
8
-0
.0
7
5
9
-0
.0
2
9
7
[0
.0
2
8
8
]
[0
.0
2
9
0
]
[0
.0
4
4
5
]
[0
.0
4
4
9
]
[0
.0
3
3
5
]
S
ta
te
*0
to
2
ye
ar
s
af
te
r
ta
ke
ov
er
-0
.0
0
2
4
-0
.0
4
7
1
0
.0
0
0
2
-0
.0
8
5
4
-0
.0
0
1
4
[0
.0
5
7
1
]
[0
.0
4
6
8
]
[0
.0
6
8
3
]
[0
.0
5
3
4
]
[0
.0
6
1
6
]
S
ta
te
*3
or
m
or
e
ye
ar
s
af
te
r
ta
ke
ov
er
-0
.0
1
5
6
-0
.0
5
0
2
0
.0
4
2
6
-0
.1
0
7
1
-0
.0
2
7
3
[0
.0
4
4
7
]
[0
.0
6
4
3
]
[0
.0
7
5
7
]
[0
.0
7
7
7
]
[0
.0
4
4
6
]
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
6
3
7
6
3
7
6
3
7
6
3
7
6
3
7
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0
.6
0
5
0
.8
5
2
0
.7
6
4
0
.8
6
4
0
.5
4
8
R
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
ra
il
w
ay
-l
ev
el
in
b
ra
ck
et
s.
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
ra
il
w
ay
F
E
,
ye
ar
F
E
,
a
n
d
ra
il
w
ay
sp
ec
ifi
c
tr
en
d
.
39
T
a
b
le
4
:
D
i↵
e
re
n
ti
a
l
A
n
ti
c
ip
a
ti
o
n
E
↵
e
c
ts
,
S
ta
te
O
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
a
n
d
P
ro
d
u
c
ti
v
it
y
,
J
o
in
t
P
a
n
e
l
L
o
g
T
F
P
(L
P
)
T
F
P
(I
N
)
L
a
b
o
r
P
ro
d
.
C
a
p
it
a
l
P
ro
d
.
F
u
el
P
ro
d
.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
S
ta
te
*-
3
to
-1
ye
ar
s
b
ef
o
re
ta
ke
ov
er
-0
.0
1
7
8
-0
.0
4
8
7
-0
.0
0
2
4
-0
.0
8
0
5
-0
.0
2
4
3
[0
.0
5
1
8
]
[0
.0
4
8
2
]
[0
.0
8
1
2
]
[0
.0
5
9
7
]
[0
.0
6
0
2
]
S
ta
te
*0
to
2
ye
ar
s
af
te
r
ta
ke
ov
er
0
.0
0
1
2
-0
.1
0
3
1
-0
.0
4
2
5
-0
.1
6
5
9
*
*
0
.0
0
6
1
[0
.0
9
8
4
]
[0
.0
7
8
0
]
[0
.1
3
0
1
]
[0
.0
7
4
8
]
[0
.1
1
2
6
]
S
ta
te
*3
or
m
or
e
ye
ar
s
af
te
r
ta
ke
ov
er
0
.0
1
2
0
-0
.1
2
2
2
0
.0
1
6
6
-0
.2
3
2
2
*
*
0
.0
0
3
6
[0
.0
8
5
4
]
[0
.1
0
0
6
]
[0
.1
6
7
9
]
[0
.0
9
5
2
]
[0
.0
9
2
7
]
D
ea
l
18
69
*-
3
to
-1
y
ea
rs
b
ef
or
e
ta
ke
ov
er
-0
.0
2
9
1
-0
.0
3
4
4
-0
.0
8
4
2
-0
.0
1
4
4
-0
.0
0
8
0
[0
.0
6
7
5
]
[0
.0
7
9
4
]
[0
.1
4
6
0
]
[0
.0
7
9
4
]
[0
.0
7
9
7
]
D
ea
l
18
69
*0
to
2
y
ea
rs
af
te
r
ta
ke
ov
er
-0
.0
0
0
8
0
.1
2
8
3
0
.1
0
7
4
0
.1
7
7
6
-0
.0
1
0
7
[0
.1
1
4
4
]
[0
.1
3
1
1
]
[0
.2
0
7
6
]
[0
.1
3
5
1
]
[0
.1
3
1
4
]
D
ea
l
18
69
*3
or
m
or
e
y
ea
rs
af
te
r
ta
ke
ov
er
-0
.0
6
9
4
0
.1
7
3
0
0
.0
5
9
3
0
.3
0
3
4
-0
.0
7
7
5
[0
.1
4
9
4
]
[0
.1
8
5
7
]
[0
.2
8
6
2
]
[0
.2
0
1
1
]
[0
.1
6
2
7
]
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
6
3
7
6
3
7
6
3
7
6
3
7
6
3
7
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0
.6
0
3
0
.8
5
3
0
.7
6
4
0
.8
6
6
0
.5
4
6
R
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
ra
il
w
ay
-l
ev
el
in
b
ra
ck
et
s.
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
ra
il
w
ay
F
E
,
ye
ar
F
E
,
a
n
d
ra
il
w
ay
sp
ec
ifi
c
tr
en
d
.
40
T
a
b
le
5
:
E
↵
e
c
ts
o
f
S
ta
te
O
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
o
n
In
v
e
st
m
e
n
t,
K
/
L
,
a
n
d
F
a
re
s
In
ve
st
m
en
t/
M
il
li
o
n
R
.
C
a
p
it
a
l/
L
a
b
o
r
(L
o
g
)
A
v
g
.
P
a
ss
F
a
re
(L
o
g
)
A
v
g
.
F
re
ig
h
t
F
a
re
(L
o
g
)
S
ol
o
J
o
in
t
S
o
lo
J
o
in
t
S
o
lo
J
o
in
t
S
o
lo
J
o
in
t
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
P
a
n
el
A
:
L
o
n
g
R
u
n
E
↵
ec
ts
S
ta
te
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
12
.9
85
*
*
*
4
.0
7
8
4
0
.1
6
3
8
*
*
*
0
.0
9
9
0
*
*
-0
.0
1
4
6
-0
.0
1
2
6
-0
.0
2
1
6
0
.0
0
0
9
[4
.2
71
]
[3
.1
4
1
2
]
[0
.0
4
9
8
]
[0
.0
3
6
4
]
[0
.0
2
0
2
]
[0
.0
2
3
7
]
[0
.0
4
1
5
]
[0
.0
4
1
6
]
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
73
8
6
1
9
7
4
4
6
3
7
6
0
2
5
4
6
6
0
1
5
4
5
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0.
15
2
0
.1
9
5
0
.7
4
7
0
.6
6
7
0
.8
3
4
0
.8
1
7
0
.8
9
7
0
.9
0
8
P
a
n
el
B
:
D
y
n
a
m
ic
s
o
f
S
ta
te
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
S
ta
te
*-
3
to
-1
ye
ar
s
b
ef
or
e
ta
ke
ov
er
-1
.4
82
0
-4
.0
3
6
4
0
.0
1
9
7
0
.0
4
4
1
-0
.0
0
7
2
-0
.0
0
0
5
-0
.0
0
7
6
-0
.0
1
6
3
[1
.5
81
4
]
[3
.0
1
8
4
]
[0
.0
5
6
4
]
[0
.0
6
0
2
]
[0
.0
3
3
4
]
[0
.0
2
6
9
]
[0
.0
3
0
6
]
[0
.0
3
3
4
]
S
ta
te
*0
to
2
ye
ar
s
af
te
r
ta
ke
ov
er
22
.2
20
9*
*
6
.4
9
2
2
0
.1
5
0
9
*
0
.0
8
5
6
-0
.0
2
1
1
-0
.0
1
2
3
-0
.0
5
2
8
-0
.0
2
7
7
[8
.5
20
6
]
[5
.1
0
0
8
]
[0
.0
8
3
5
]
[0
.0
6
2
3
]
[0
.0
3
2
9
]
[0
.0
3
6
3
]
[0
.0
4
8
1
]
[0
.0
5
1
1
]
S
ta
te
*3
or
m
or
e
ye
ar
s
af
te
r
ta
ke
ov
er
3.
57
23
*
*
*
-1
.9
0
1
0
0
.2
1
5
8
*
*
*
0
.1
4
9
7
*
*
-0
.0
1
3
1
-0
.0
0
9
0
-0
.0
0
7
9
0
.0
1
3
0
[0
.7
07
1
]
[2
.7
5
3
9
]
[0
.0
5
8
0
]
[0
.0
5
3
2
]
[0
.0
3
5
7
]
[0
.0
3
9
1
]
[0
.0
6
4
6
]
[0
.0
6
4
0
]
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
73
8
6
1
9
7
4
4
6
3
7
6
0
2
5
4
6
6
0
1
5
4
5
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0.
20
2
0
.2
1
0
0
.7
4
8
0
.6
6
7
0
.8
3
3
0
.8
1
6
0
.8
9
7
0
.9
0
8
R
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
ra
il
w
ay
-l
ev
el
in
b
ra
ck
et
s.
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
ra
il
w
ay
F
E
,
ye
ar
F
E
,
an
d
ra
il
w
ay
sp
ec
ifi
c
tr
en
d
.
A
v
g.
p
as
s.
fa
re
is
th
e
su
m
re
ce
iv
ed
to
ca
rr
y
on
e
p
a
ss
en
g
er
o
n
e
m
il
e
a
n
d
av
g
.
fr
ei
g
h
t
fa
re
is
th
e
su
m
re
ce
iv
ed
to
ca
rr
y
o
n
e
to
n
o
f
g
o
o
d
s
o
n
e
m
il
e.
41
